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The relationship between the level of the minimum wage and the level of
unemployment has been a topic of debate in many countries, with a recent
outburst of controversy in the US, started by Card and Krueger (1995). So
far, only market imperfections1 are able to give a theoretical explanation for
the case-study ndings that lowering minimum wages, at best, only has a
small positive eect on the number of jobs in the short run2. In this paper,
a team-production model of the labour market is developed, without market
imperfections, which seems to t most facts known about individual labour
market behaviour, and which still gives the prediction that the height of the
minimum wage, within a certain range, has no eect on employment in the
short run. In the long run, technological change may reduce the number of
jobs if a minimum wage is increased.
The main feature of the model is that all production takes place in teams.
Teams consist of a number of low-skilled jobs and high-skilled jobs, whereby
the high-skilled jobs can only be performed by high-skilled workers and the
low-skilled jobs can be performed by both high-skilled workers and low-skilled
1Examples are monopsony models and eciency wage model (see e.g. Card and Krueger
(1995), Manning (1995), Dolado et al. (1996)), which depend on large search frictions
(monopsony), incomplete contracting (eciency wages), and an inability of unemployed
individuals to set up their own rms.
2See Card and Krueger (1995) for a review of the US literature on this issue, see Dolado
et al. (1996) and Blank (1994) for a review of European case-studies on this issue.
1workers.3 Because production is organised in teams, individual workers can-
not be paid according to their marginal productivities but receive part of the
team's output. The division of the team's output amongst workers then fol-
lows from the relative number of high-skilled and low-skilled workers in the
whole economy. Under certain conditions, low-skilled workers are then wage
takers: they will accept all wage oers which are above their outside option.
In such circumstances a minimum wage redistributes the output between
high-skilled workers and low-skilled workers, without aecting employment
in team production.
The aspect of team-production that makes it possible in this model that
higher low-skilled wages (via an increase in the minimum wage or benet lev-
els) do not lead to greater unemployment, is that low-skilled workers cannot
produce nal goods without high-skilled workers. This means that low-skilled
workers are unemployed, irrespective of their wages, if there are not enough
high-skilled workers to go around, even if the most low-skill intensive optimal
production technology is used4. Although it seems obvious that no individ-
ual works in isolation and that production in Western economies is virtually
always organised in teams, it is less obvious that low-skilled workers can-
not work in isolation from high-skilled workers. The assumption that each
low-skilled worker needs a xed, or at least minimum, amount of high-skilled
workers to produce with, does seems plausible however: even industries with
a high percentage of low-skilled workers cannot increase the number of low-
skilled workers without having to hire more high-skilled workers, or at least
use intermediate goods which are produced by high-skilled workers. Take for
instance the cleaning industry, which is usually regarded as an industry with
only low-skilled workers. Although a cleaner will usually be low-skilled and
will clean alone, it takes a personnel oce to handle his or administration, it
takes a manager to explain which cleaning material to use on which surfaces
and when to clean what, it takes a lawyer to draw up the employment con-
tracts which take care of all contingencies, it takes a chaueur to drive the
3The type of team production used in this paper is quite similar to the one used by
Kremer (1993), who used it to study economic development. The addition to Kremer's
model and other models of team production is the introduction of the distinction between
dierent types of workers and dierent types of jobs.
4Note that it is possible that if there is a technology in which high-skilled workers are
very productive which requires fe low-skilled jobs, there need be no alternative technology
in which high-skilled workers could earn more, even if low-skilled workers are willing to
work for nothing.
2cleaner to the place that needs to be cleaned, it takes a chemical industry
to produce the intermediate cleaning goods, it takes accountancy skills to go
over the books, etc. It is hard to think of a situation where a low-skilled
cleaner could perform his activities without any high-skilled worker making
a contribution to the nal good. This will also hold for other industries and
services5.
One reason for the fact that each producer uses a minimum of high-skilled
workers in the production of nal goods is federal legislation and jurispru-
dence. Laws on working conditions and liability laws force each employer
to spend a minimum amount of legal fees on drawing up labour contracts
and managing personnel. Try as they may, it is dicult to see how low-
skilled workers can avoid being paired to the skills of accountants, lawyers,
managers, designers, IT workers, etc.
In Section 2, the benchmark model is presented, which describes a labour
market with homogenous low-skilled workers and homogenous high-skilled
workers and a team production function.
Five extensions to the benchmark are discussed: the rst extension con-
siders the eect of heterogeneous low-skilled labour. The second extension
generalises the type of team production involved and discusses the politics
of a minimum wage. The third extension introduces labour supply curves
into the model, and discusses how we may incorporate notions of techno-
logical change into the model. The fourth extension looks at what happens
if we allow for more than one possible team production function and dis-
cusses the implications for the eects of a minimum wage on the incentives
for technological change. The fth extension somewhat loosely discusses the
interaction between the labour dynamics and the political dynamics of an
economy which is based on team production. It looks at the transition prob-
abilities between low-skilled workers and high-skilled workers and focuses on
the eect of free general education on these transition probabilities and the
ensuing political support for general education.
Section 3 concludes by making the case for and against a minimum wage.
5The only major sector of the economy I can think of where production can occur
without any high-skilled workers is illegal prostitution.
32 The benchmark model
Consider a simple description of the labour market: there are two types of
workers, high-skilled and low-skilled, and two types of jobs, high-skilled jobs
and low-skilled jobs. The high-skilled workers are able to perform both jobs,
whereas the low-skilled workers are only able to perform low-skilled jobs.
There are N high-skilled workers and M low-skilled workers. For simplicity
we take the high-skilled workers to be a homogeneous group. Also the low-
skilled workers are homogeneous.
More specically, the quality of high-skilled workers (i=1,..,N) at high-
skilled work equals q1i = 1; the quality of high-skilled workers at low-skilled
work equals q2i = 1; the quality of low-skilled workers at high-skilled jobs
equals q1j = 0; and the quality of low-skilled workers at low-skilled jobs
equals q2j = 1: High-skilled workers thus have a comparative advantage over
low-skilled workers at high-skilled jobs but no absolute advantage over low-
skilled workers at low-skilled jobs.
In team production one high-skilled job is coupled with one low-skilled
job. The output of each team is denoted by Q and equals6
Q = q1q2
where q1 equals the quality of the person doing the high-skilled job, and
where q2 denotes the quality of the person doing the low-skilled job. This
means that the output of a high-skilled worker and a low-skilled worker in
one team equals ; and the output of a high-skilled worker with a high-skilled
worker in one team also yields : Two low-skilled workers in a team produce
0.
All workers have an outside option b which they obtain if they do not
work in a team. The level b may be interpreted in two ways: it may rstly
be interpreted as the benet level and more generally, as the value of not
working. Secondly, it may be interpreted as the output of an individual who
does not work in team production. In order to ensure non-triviality we will
only look at cases where b<
2: In the remainder, b will be interpreted as the
benet level.
The output of each team is divided between the person doing the high-
skilled job and the person doing the low-skilled job. The way in which a
6Note that this production function is not a Leontie production function as it allows
low-skilled workers to be substituted by high-skilled workers.
4competitive equilibrium occurs is that teams pay each worker a wage such
that no two individual workers could improve both their pay-os by forming
a team of their own. For simplicity, the formation and dissolution of teams is
assumed to occur instantaneously and without costs. This means that there
can be only one wage level w1 earned by all high-skilled persons. Also, there
is one wage level w2 earned by all persons performing the low-skilled job.
The solution of this model is surprisingly simple:
1. If M<N, then w1 = w2 = 
2: This follows directly from arbitrage: if two
high-skilled individuals are paid less than w1, they could start their
own team and receive 
2: If a low-skilled individual was paid less, he
could always nd a high-quality person who is presently working with
another high-skilled worker (and thus receives 
2); who will be prepared
to pay the low-skilled worker more than the low-skilled individual was
paid before.
2. If M>N, then w2 = b and w1 =    b: Again this follows directly from
arbitrage: if there is a low-skilled individual j who is paid higher, then
a low-skilled individual currently receiving the outside option of b is
prepared to replace individual j for less pay. M-N low-skilled individuals
do not work in team production and receive b.
3. If M=N then any division of the output can be an equilibrium in beliefs
as long as w2  b and w2  
2.
Because the possibility that MN is rather uninteresting, we will only
discuss the more likely case that M>N, in which case low-skilled workers
earn less than high-skilled workers. We may notice that in that case the
description of the labour market satises many found regularities about the
labour market: if one particular unemployed low-skilled individual is given an
added incentive to nd a job, for instance by giving him a bonus for nding
a job, that individual will undercut the current employed low-skilled workers
and will nd a job7. Another obvious point is that any low-skilled worker
demanding a higher wage is simply replaced by a dierent low-skilled worker.
In this sense it is indeed the case that the increase in the wage demands of
7For recent empirical literature on the eectiveness of incentives on individual search
behaviour, see e.g. Van der Berg et al. (1997). For a general discussion of the results of
equilibrium search models, see Ridder and Van den Berg (1997).
5one worker leads to that worker's unemployment. As long as b<
2; however,
the benet level does not aect the number of persons employed in team
production. The outcome of the model is described in Figure 2.1, where
we have plotted the wage of low-skilled individuals (and hence also of high-
skilled individuals) against the number of low-skilled individuals in the whole
economy.
As one can see, there is a dramatic decrease in the wages of the low-skilled
workers when the number of low-skilled workers surpasses N (unbroken bold
line). The eect of a minimum wage is depicted by the broken bold line and
shows that the wages of those low-skilled workers in team production will be
at the minimum wage level, without any change in the number of individuals
working in team production: as long as 
2 >m>b, then we immediately see
that w2 = m for M>N. In other words, the only eect of a minimum wage
will be to redistribute output from high-skilled workers to low-skilled workers,
with no eect on employment in team production.
We may notice trivially for the benchmark model that when M>N, there
is a majority of individuals in favour of adopting a minimum wage.
62.1 A rst extension: heterogeneous workers.
An obvious objection to the benchmark model is that we have assumed all
low-skilled workers to be equally productive. We will see that if we relax
this assumption, we obtain a more complex outcome, but there is still the
possibility that a minimum wage has no eect on employment.
Therefore, take q1i =q2i = 1; q1j = 0 and q2j 2 [0;1]: The quality of
low-skilled workers at low-skilled work (=q2j) has a cumulative distribution
F(q2j): The rest of the model is the same.
Again the solution of this extended model is simple:
1. all low-skilled individuals with q2j < 1
2+ b
 will not be employed in team
production. This follows from the fact that the output of a team with
a high-skilled worker and a low-skilled worker has to be above (
2 + b)
which denotes the sum of the outside options of the high-skilled worker




)) then all low-skilled individuals with quality lower
than F 1( N
M) will not be employed in team production and will receive
b. The other low-skilled workers will receive b+(q2j F 1( N
M)): This
means that all high-skilled individuals receive F 1( N
M) b: The reason
is that the lowest quality low-skilled worker to be employed in team
production will only receive the value of his outside option. Because
of the possibility of arbitrage,low-skilled workers with higher quality
than this will receive the full extra production which their employment
results in.
3. if N
M > (1   F(1
2 + b
)) then all low-skilled workers with quality higher
than 1
2 + 2b
 will receive q2j   
2: All high-skilled workers will receive 
2:
The reason here is again arbitrage: because there are less low-skilled
workers with quality high enough to be employed in team production
than that there are high-skilled workers, the low-skilled workers will
be paid the team's output minus the outside option of the high-skilled
worker.




)) then a marginal change in the benet level will have no
eect on employment and will only increase the fraction of the output going
7to the lower skilled workers. Then also the imposition and the height of a
minimum wage will have no employment eects as long as m<F 1( N
M)   
2;
which denes the point at which an increase of the minimum wage will make
the lowest quality low-skilled individual to be employed to have an income so
high that the high-skilled co-worker earns less than 
2: This case is depicted
in gure 2.2
In gure 2.2. we see that all those with quality less than F 1( N
M) are not
employed in team production and earn b. Those with quality higher than
F 1( N
M) have wages increasing with their skill levels (unbroken bold line).
The imposition of a minimum wage only changes the height of the wage
prole of low-skilled workers involved in team production, not their numbers
(the broken bold line). We may also see that virtually no one in this situation
actually earns m: a minimum wage changes the income distribution without
it being necessary than any individual actually earns the minimum wage.




Then a minimum wage which is above the outside option b directly leads to
the lowest-quality low-skilled worker employed to be too expensive and hence
unemployed. In that case, an increase in the minimum wage will result in
unemployment. Also, an increase in the benet level b will reduce the number
of low-skilled individuals employed in team production.
8In other words, if the number of low-skilled persons relative to the number
of high-skilled individuals is large enough, the imposition and the height of
a minimum wage has, within bounds, no eect on employment levels. What
will happen in the case of heterogeneous quality is that higher quality low-
skilled workers will earn more than lower quality low-skilled workers.
2.2 Extension two: bigger teams
The politics of the minimum wage in the benchmark model were simple: if
M>N then there is a majority in favour of a minimum wage, whereas if M<N
the low-skilled workers already earn the same amount as high-skilled workers
and a minimum wage is meaningless. These results change however if we
allow for a somewhat more exible form of the production function. E.g. we








where q1k denotes the quality of the k'th person in a team doing the high-
skilled job, and q2l the quality of the l'th person in the team at low-skilled
work.
Compared to the benchmark, the result change slightly: if M
J > N
I then
every low-skilled person earns b, and each high-skilled person earns  Jb
I ; and




then all workers earn 
I+J and a minimum wage has no purpose.
The main change is to the politics of the minimum wage; it is now no
longer necessarily the case that a majority of individuals will prefer a mini-
mum wage if it has no employment eect: if M
J > N
I and M<N then a minimum
wage may be benecial to the lower skilled workers and may have no employ-
ment eect, but a majority of individuals will not support it. Worse still, in
this case, a majority of high-skilled individuals will have an interest in lower-
ing the benet levels to zero, which will increase the wages of the high-skilled
and decreases the wages of the low-skilled without aecting employment.
2.3 Extension three: labour supply curves
Another extension to the model is to allow some heterogeneity in the labour
supply curve of individuals: for some individuals the value of unemployment
9will dier to that of others, for instance because of child-rearing responsibili-
ties. I thus dene a labour supply curve for the lower skilled workers, denote
dby
Lj
M = L(b;w2); which is dened as the proportion of low-skilled workers
who is prepared to work in a team for wages w2 when there is a benet level
b. Now there obviously should hold that @L
@b < 0; @L
@w2  0;L(:;0) = 0: There
is now the question how much labour the high-skilled workers will supply.
Note that in all cases the high-skilled workers will earn at least 
I+J when
working and will only earn b when they do not work. It seems reasonable
to suppose that this dierence is quite high and that therefore virtually all
high-skilled workers will supply their labour. For simplicity therefore, all
high-skilled workers are taken to supply their labour at any wage above or at
a wage level of 
I+J: Formally, this means I assume L(b;w) = 1 if w  
I+J:8
The result is that the wage of the low-skilled individuals is the maximum
of b and the solution to N
I =M
J L(b;w2): We can then again see that an in-
crease in m or b will have no eect on employment as long as m< 
I+J and
M
J L(b;w2)  N
I respectively.
By adding the more general form of the team production function and
a labour-supply curve to the benchmark, we can operationalise the notion
of technological change: a technological change is any change in ; M, N, I,
or J. The question now arises what technological change will do to the wage
structure and the number of employed persons? To answer this question







); and w1 equals  Jw2
I : We take the ve parameters in turn. As the
initial situation we take a core solution, i.e., b < w2 < 
I+J:
An increase in  will increase w1; and will mean no change in employment
or w2. This has one important implication: a change in the total output of
a team will always change the wages of the high-skilled workers, but not
necessarily the wages of the lower-skilled workers. This means that high-
skilled workers may have a greater incentive to nd ways to increase the
total output of the team than low-skilled workers9.
8A very interesting option would arise with the possibility for a backward bending labour
supply curve (when @L
@w < 0 for values of w higher than a certain value, say W). As the
demand for low-skilled jobs is ultimately determined by the number of high-skilled workers
employed, this could give rise to the possibility that the employment of low-skilled workers
increases with an increase in the minimum wage when the initial high-skilled wage is above
W : the increase in the labour supply of high-skilled workers due to a reduction in their
wages could increase the labour demand for low-skilled jobs.
9Notice that this is not the case if N
I >M
J because then, any increase in overall productiv-
10An increase in M or a decrease in N will have the result of decreasing w2
and increasing w1:
An increase in J has the combined eect of increasing w2, decreasing w1
and increasing employment. This implies that there is an incentive for high-
skilled workers to nd technologies that minimise the number of low-skilled
jobs needed. Low-skilled workers have an incentive to nd technologies that
maximize the number of low-skilled jobs in production.
An increase in I (without a change in ) will lead to a lower w2 and lower
employment levels, but has an ambiguous eect on w1: To see this, consider































J : In that case the increase
of I increases w1: The eect of an increase of I on w1 therefore depends on
the shape of L. The eect of an increase in I on w2 (from I to I) is illustrated
in Figure 2.3. In Figure 2.3 the change in wages can be seen to be a decrease
in the wages of the lower skilled from w2 to w
2: The wages of the high-skilled




I ; which cannot be seen from this gure.
One can also see in this gure that the imposition of a minimum wage
would have meant no change in the wages or employment levels of each
worker: the employment level of low-skilled individuals is completely deter-
mined by the number of high-skilled individuals in the economy, not the
wages of the low-skilled individuals: as long as virtually everybody is pre-
pared to supply their labour for an equal share of the team output, 
I+J;
a minimum wage does not aect employment. Without a minimum wage,
the skill biased technological change (an increase in I) results in a decrease
in the wages of the lower skilled workers and has had an ambiguous eect
on w1: This allows for the possibility that an increase in I (which is a skill-
biased technological change) increases the wages of the high-skilled workers,
ity () is shared between high-skilled and low-skilled workers. If technological inventions
are always made by high-skilled workers, we may thus have the perverse outcome that an
abundance of low-skilled workers increases the incentives for technological change!
11even though the output of the team in which high-skilled workers work re-
mains the same. This oers a competing explanation for the recent change in
the wage structure in the US and some other Western countries10: Krueger
(1993) for instance argues that the reason that high-skilled individuals have
started to earn a lot more in recent years, especially relatively to low-skilled
workers, is because of their higher productivity caused by the introduction of
computers. The explanation given here is that they have become relatively
scarcer because of technological innovation. This could mean that higher
skilled individuals will have become relatively more productive, but not nec-
essarily so. The new situation could for instance also arise if companies need
more lawyers to draw up their contracts and ght lawsuits than before (only
a change in I): if we take lawyers as high-skilled, then an increase in their
importance for companies does not imply an increasing productivity of high-
skilled workers, but will certainly make high-skilled workers scarcer. As a
result, an increase in the number of lawyers per company may increase the
wages of high-skilled workers in the whole economy and reduce the wages of
the low-skilled. Another possibility is that the productivity of all workers
has risen equally (an increase in ), but that this increase only benets the
10for a review of explanations of recent trends in unemployment and wages in Western
countries, see e.g. Krugman (1996).
12wages of the high-skilled because there are relatively few high-skilled persons
(this occurs if N
I <M
J ). If either of these two alternatives is the case, we should
empirically nd that high-skilled individuals earn the same wage everywhere,
independent of the technology they use (the wages of the high-skilled increase
because of their increased scarcity, not because of their use of "new" tech-
nologies). The recent ndings by Entorf and Kramarz (1997) somewhat seem
to support this as they nd that the use of new technologies themselves only
marginally increases the wages of high-skilled workers.
2.4 Extension four: multiple production functions
So far the model has assumed that there is only one possible way to combine
low-skilled jobs and high-skilled jobs in a team. In reality, there are many
possible combinations. Some types of teams require more high-skilled jobs
than others. In this section this is recognised by allowing for the possibility
that there are two possible team technologies, whereby the term "team tech-
nology" refers to a particular combination of high-skilled jobs and low-skilled














The other assumptions are the same as in the previous section: we have
a labour supply curve for unskilled workers, denoted by M  L(b;w2); there
are N high-skilled persons in the economy and M low-skilled persons.
Without loss of generality, the structure of the teams is normalised, so
that each team employs an equal amount of workers, i.e., J2 = (J1+I1 I2).
By denition, the second possible team is relatively low-skill intensive: J1 <
J2. Also, the team production with more high-skilled jobs is in principle
more productive, i.e., 1 > 2: The rst point to note about these production
functions is that we can only observe the second form of team production if
(2 w2J2)
I2  1
I2+J2: If this condition is not satised, then the maximum wage
that high-skilled workers can earn in team 2, which equals
(2 w2J2)
I2 ; is less
than the minimum they could earn in team 1, which is 1
I2+J2. Conversely,
13there will be no teams of type 1 if there doesn't hold that the maximum
high-skilled workers could earn in team 1 is higher than the minimum in
team 2, i.e., if
(1 w2J1)
I1  2
I1+J1: In order to avoid triviality, we assume that
these conditions are met when the wages of low skilled workers are at the
benet level, but we note that it is possible that technologies exist which are
not optimal for any wage levels of the low-skilled.
Given these additions to the model, a labour demand function for low-
skilled workers, denoted by LD(N;w2); can be constructed. Using simple
arbitrage reasoning, it is found that the form of the labour demand function
is characterised as follows:
 If w2 > 1
I2+J2; LD = 0: In this case, the wages of the low-skilled are so
high that high-skilled workers are better o working without low-skilled
persons altogether.
 If 1
I2+J2 = w2; then LD can be any number between 0 and J2
N
I1 : in this
case high-skilled workers are indierent between working with other
high-skilled workers or low-skilled workers in a team type 1. The labour
demand for low-skilled workers at that wage level therefore ranges from
0 to the maximum number of low-skilled workers which could work in
teams of type 1 given the number of high-skilled workers.
 If 1
I2+J2 > w2 > I12 I21
I1J2 I2J1 ; LD = J2
N
I1: In this case, the wages of the
low-skilled workers are such, that production in the second team yields
a lower outcome for the high-skilled workers than production in the
rst team. Also, the wages of the low-skilled workers are low enough
to allow the high-skilled workers to earn more in combination with
low-skilled workers than without low-skilled workers.
 If I12 I21





in this case high-skilled workers are indierent between working in a
type 1 team and a type 2 team.
 If I12 I21
I1J2 I2J1 > w2, LD = J2
N
I2: In this case, the wages of the low-skilled
workers is so low that the high-skilled workers can earn most by working
in the type 1 team.
The outcome to the model is now very simple: w2 equals the solution to
LD(N;w2) = M  L(b;w2): This model is characterised by Figure 2.4. In the
14example of Figure 2.4, the equilibrium low-skilled wage, w
2; is so low that
all production takes place in teams of type 2, and where the number of low-
skilled workers employed is again below the number of low-skilled workers,
implying unemployment. One may see that if M L(b;w2) is below J2
N
I2; then
only the rst type of team technology is used. For J2
N
I2 < ML(b;w2) < J2
N
I1;
both types of team technologies are observed. For M  L(b;w2) > J2
N
I1; only
the second team technology is used.
This extension makes it possible to analyse the eect of a technological
invention: if a new team production technology is discovered, the labour
demand curve for low-skilled jobs will shift. Consider an example whereby
1 increases, which means an increase in the output of the skill-intensive
team. As a result, I12 I21
I1J2 I2J1 decreases which means that the switch towards
the team technology 1 occurs at a lower low-skilled wage. If initially J2
N
I2 <
M L(b;w2) < J2
N
I1; the result is that the wages of all the low-skilled workers
decrease, even in the teams which use the second technology.
The gure also makes it clear that a minimum wage will have no eect on
employment, as long as it is lower than I12 I21
I1J2 I2J1 : A minimum wage above this
value dramatically reduces the demand for low-skilled jobs. This means, that
even if low-skilled workers are in the majority, they would not necessarily vote
for a very high minimum wage, but could vote for a minimum wage below
15I12 I21
I1J2 I2J1 :
An interesting aspect of a minimum wage is how it aects the incentives
for technological change: a minimum wage below I12 I21
I1J2 I2J1 does not change
the incentives of the low-skilled workers. Also, high-skilled workers remain
the only workers whose wages increase from a marginal increase in overall
productivity (1 and 2). However, high-skilled workers will have an in-
creased incentive to lower the number of low-skilled workers needed in either
production technology. The changed incentives may well in the long run
lead to more unemployment for the low-skilled workers if a minimum wage
is introduced.
Multiple team technologies thus allows for a wider notion of technological
change, i.e., the discovery of team production technologies. The fundamental
characteristic of the model with respect to minimum wages remains the same
however: if the number of low-skilled workers is high enough, a minimum
wage above the market clearing wage has no employment eect in the short
run.
A nal issue to consider in team production is the nature of unemploy-
ment. Is unemployment voluntary? The answer depends on whether there
is a minimum wage or not. Those who are unemployed without a minimum
wage are so by choice; the value of non-employment for them is simply greater
than that of employment. Although a change in the benet level would have
an impact on the willingness to accept a job, this need not have the eect
that the number of employed goes up; a change in the benet level may
simply change the equilibrium wage, without aecting employment. Those
unemployed in an economy with a minimum wage may not be voluntarily
unemployed as some of them would accept a job-oer if they were given one.
Unemployment in an economy with a minimum wage may thus be invol-
untary. Those who are then unemployed are so "by accident". Even so, a
decrease of the minimum wage does not necessarily increase the number of
unemployed, but will decrease the market clearing wage for all low-skilled
workers.
2.5 Extension ve: dynamics and education
One important determinant of the wages of dierent individuals is the num-
ber of low-skilled individuals and the number of high-skilled individuals. So
far the numbers of individuals classied as low-skilled and high-skilled are
exogenous. The question we now address is how education provided by the
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low-skilled individuals. An intimately related question is how political sup-
port for general education evolves over time as the number of low-skilled
individuals and high-skilled individuals changes. Both questions are consid-
ered simultaneously.
If in the initial period M0
J >N0
I , then the low-skilled workers will earn less
than the high-skilled individuals and will thus have an incentive to become
high-skilled. It therefore seems likely that if M0
J >N0
I and the minimum wage
is low or non-existing (e.g., always lower than I12 I21
I1J2 I2J1 ), that the low-skilled
workers will either try themselves to become high-skilled or at least encour-
age their children to become high-skilled. Obviously educational provisions
to workers and their families will play an important part in their chances of
becoming high-skilled: given that it is in practice impossible for low-skilled
individuals to borrow against expected future incomes, the provision of good
general education determines their chances of becoming high-skilled. Provi-
sion of good education by the state, henceforth called general education, will
be supported by low-skilled individuals. For the already high-skilled persons
the situation is dierent: given their higher wages, they are able to aord
good education for themselves and their children anyway and will only have
to contend with increased competition if the number of high-skilled individ-
uals increases. If we translate this to the politics of general education, a
dynamic issue is revealed: as general education increases the amount of indi-
viduals that are high-skilled, the support for general education will dwindle.
Once abolished, the lack of general education will reduce the inow into
high-skilled labour. If there is now a constant counter ow from high-skilled
to low-skilled, then the number of low-skilled individuals will increase until
they again form the majority, from whence the cycle starts afresh. We can
thus get an innitely repeated cycle of an abolition (or reduction in quality)
of general education and the re-introduction (or improvement in quality) of
general education.
Making these arguments more formally, I assume that each period a frac-
tion  of the high-skilled persons becomes low-skilled. This can be inter-
preted as the number of high-skilled individuals, who, despite the benet of
good education and high wages, do not manage to pass on their skill level
to the next period. All high-skilled individuals follow general education if
it is provided and follow private education if it is not available. In either
case, the cost of education per individual following education is the same.
If general education is provided then each period a fraction e of the low-
17skilled individuals becomes high-skilled. Without general education, there
are still some exceptional low-skilled individuals who become high-skilled in
the next period, but the fraction is smaller, namely noe: As general educa-
tion is paid for by taxing income proportionally, it will be obvious that the
high-skilled individuals will have no interest in providing general education,
whereas if e noe is suciently large, the lower skilled individuals will want
general education. In order to keep the argument simple, I simply assume
here that this is the case: everybody wants to follow general education, but
low-skilled individuals cannot aord it themselves and hence will vote for
general education.
We now know that if general education is provided, Mt
M0+N0 will tend to
e
+e and that if general education is not provided, Mt








2 then there are always more low-skilled
individuals than high-skilled individuals and there is a permanent majority
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+noe then, whatever the initial values of M0 and N0, there will
come a moment that we will enter a cycle: if initially M0>N0 then a majority
will want general education and eventually a moment arrives when Mt<Nt
and the general education is abolished until Mt is again greater than Nt, ad
innitum. If initially M0<N0 then there will be no general education initially
and hence Mt will grow over time , which will ensure that there will come a
time that Mt>Nt at which moment general education is introduced, leading
to a decrease in Mt; ad innitum.
A nal point of interest is to consider what eect a minimum wage
will have on the transition probabilities, and, because total output is non-
decreasing in the number of high-skilled individuals, on output in the long
run (see Manning (1995) for references to other work on this issue). On the
one hand, a minimum wage decreases the incentive for low-skilled workers
to become high-skilled, and decreases the incentive for high-skilled workers
to avoid becoming low-skilled. This would mean that minimum wages will
decrease e and noe; increase ; and therefore will lead to an increase in
the number of low-skilled individuals and hence to a decline in total output.
Also, as we have seen, a minimum wage increases the incentives of high-skilled
workers to reduce the number of low-skilled jobs needed in production and
may in the longer run lead to team technologies needing less low-skilled jobs.
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skilled workers to aord better education: as it is in practice very dicult
to borrow against future earnings, low-skilled workers with very low wages
cannot aord good education and may not even be able to aord the time it
takes to get an education, even if education were itself free. Then a higher
minimum wage will increase the transition probability from low-skilled to
high-skilled workers, i.e., e and noe. This would increase the number of
high-skilled workers and hence output. Another possible positive eect of a
minimum wage is that forward looking low-skilled workers receiving a mini-
mum wage may anticipate that changes in team technology will reduce the
number of low-skilled jobs in the future and may hence have an added incen-
tive to become high-skilled. Which eect dominates depends on the precise
assumptions one makes about the utility functions of individuals and the
constraints facing them, but the conicting eects at least allows for the
possibility that a minimum wage is benecial for total output in a dynamic
economy and is benecial for current generations of low-skilled workers. It
may be noted however that if political decisions are indeed based solely on
self-informed interests of voters, as is assumed in this section, the whole
academic debate about minimum wages is immaterial and only provides ar-
guments for political decisions which are made anyway on the basis of relative
numbers.
3 Conclusions
To summarise the arguments in this paper, a case will be made for and
against an increase in the minimum wage.
First the case for the defence of a minimum wage increase. An increase
in a minimum wage will, if the increase is within bounds, only increase the
percentage of the output that low-skilled workers receive, without altering
their employment numbers. If the marginal utility of income decreases with
income, a minimum wage will thus increase social welfare in the short term.
In the short term it is even possible that the reduction in the wages of
the high-skilled workers will increase the labour supply of the high-skilled
workers, thereby increasing employment of low-skilled workers and output
in the short run. As to the long run: because low-skilled workers are in
practice not able to borrow against future wages, a higher minimum wage
may increase the education that low-skilled workers are able to aord for
19themselves and their children, thereby increasing the number of high-skilled
workers. This will increase total output in the long run. If there is a long run
negative eect of a higher minimum wage on the number of low-skilled jobs,
this will increase the incentives of low-skilled workers to become high-skilled,
increasing output even further in the long run. Empirically, this possibility
does not conict with the ndings that individual low-skilled workers increase
their labour supply and their employment prospects if benets are lowered, or
that labour demand for low-skilled workers, in any particular rm or industry,
decreases if the wages of the low-skilled workers increases. These are all
the eect of the fact that high-skilled workers will move to those rms and
industries where they can earn higher wages and will try and combine with
those low-skilled workers who will accept the lowest wages. An economy-wide
minimum wage will make this "eeing" behaviour impossible. The empirical
evidence for this view comes from case studies which suggest that an increase
in the minimum wage does not lead to a substantial reduction in the number
of employed workers in the short run.
Now the case against an increase of the minimum wage. If a large in-
crease in the minimum wage crosses a technological "switching point", where
an existing alternative team technology becomes optimal for the high-skilled
workers, the number of low-skilled workers employed will decrease dramat-
ically. As this technology is not used before the increase of the minimum
wage, there is no way to empirically tell beforehand whether such a techno-
logical switching point will be crossed or not. Even in the short run therefore,
an increase in the minimum wage may unexpectedly result in a large reduc-
tion in the employment levels of low-skilled workers. In the longer run, the
increased incentives for high-skilled workers to nd technologies that reduce
the number of low-skilled jobs in production, may reduce the long run de-
mand for low-skilled jobs. This may explain why the US and European case
studies nd such a small eect of a change in the minimum wage: as it takes
time to develop and implement new technologies, the eects of a minimum
wage under team production will only be felt in the long run. Also, the
increase in a minimum wage may reduce the incentives for low-skilled work-
ers to become high-skilled, increasing the number of low-skilled workers and
hence reducing output in the long run. A nal possibility is that an increase
in the minimum wage decreases the wage of high-skilled workers and reduces
the labour supply of high-skilled workers, thereby reducing the demand for
20low-skilled workers, even in the short run11.
Both cases make arguments about what happens to technology and the
number of low-skilled workers in the long run, as a result of a higher min-
imum wage. As it is virtually impossible in an empirical study to separate
the long-run eects of a minimum wage on employment and transition prob-
abilities, from all the other factors that inuence employment levels and
transition probabilities (business cycles, technology shocks, changes in the
international competitive environment, government intervention in educa-
tion markets, etc.), I have little hope that either of these cases can be proven
convincingly.
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